Stability in the Northeast: Imperative for Implementation of Act East Policy

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Abstract

Conflict resolution and communication connectivity are key to stability in the North-east for implementation of Act East Policy of India. The developing nexus between drug and weapon cartels, insurgents and (Inter-Services roque intelligence agencies Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and Chinese Intelligence agencies) will be a greater challenge to the state to bring peace and development in the region. In fact, there is an endeavour to reorganise and realign the anti-talk factions so as to maintain instability in the Northeast. The objective is to revive, resuscitate and energise the insurgent groups by coordinating and organising them under umbrella organisations to avoid inter-group clashes and competition. The objectives are clear to keep India engaged within the Northeast and keep it out of Myanmar to deny land connectivity with the ASEAN and South East Asian nations. The instability in the Northeast is now slowly shifting in the hands of external players and the larger strategic objective is to choke development and economic, political and cultural linkages with ASEAN and South East Asia.

Introduction

igwedge ore than 90 per cent of the area of the Northeast Region

(NER) is bordered by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and Nepal. Northeast is a strategic springboard and strength for India, however, if this strength is not leveraged it can also become a vulnerability. East India Company was lured to the North East India by the natural resources and the geography-coal, tea, oil and access to Myanmar and even to Tibet. Assam had 1st oil well in Asia in 1889. The North Eastern states of India account for approximately 8 per cent of the country's geographical area with just about 4 per cent of the national population. 70 per cent population in the Northeast lives in Brahmaputra Valley and the balance 30 per cent in the rest of the six states. The region has over 160 scheduled tribes and over 400 other tribal and sub-tribal communities. The NER is a land bridge to ASEAN and South East Asia, it lies in the flight path of the Asian Highway and an alternative modern silk route.¹ The NER gives India access to oil and a resource-rich region of South Asia and it also provides access to markets of bordering countries. Professor Pranab Das in his report, "North-East, 'The Power House of India': Prospect and Problems" estimated that North Eastern states including Sikkim have the potential of 84,000 MW of hydro power, which is about 43 per cent of the total hydro power generation capacity in the country. The hydrocarbon reserves in Nagaland may increase India's onshore oil and natural gas production potential by 75 per cent.² Nagaland itself has 600 million tons of oil. Similarly Meghalaya has close to 576 million tons of coal.3 The NER indeed is a resource bowl with reserves of uranium, coal, chromite, lignite, and potential deposits of Platinum Group of Elements (PGE), quartzite deposits, granite, limestone and renewable energy. The North East is rain surplus; the surface water resource of the region is close to 652.3 Billion Cubic meters that is approximately 34 per cent of country's total water wealth.4

Geographical and Economic Fault-lines

The NER should be exploited as a platform to expand political and strategic boundaries of India up to Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam through land, cultural connectivity and Mekong cooperation. India should have become a development partner with the Eastern neighbours instead of China. In spite of being resource rich region of India, the question is, why this region is still underdeveloped and mired in multiple insurgencies and secessionist movements? There are certainly internal and external factors but what is more important is that India failed to bridge geographical, political and economic fault-lines. Most significant is connectivity. Even after 72 years of independence, three out of seven state capitals are yet to be connected by railways and the region continues to suffer from inadequate connectivity and remains a borderland in the perception of national polity and executive. Whereas, geographical, economic and political fault-lines can be bridged by developing communication highways, education and making people stakeholders in holistic development of the region. What is essential at this stage is to remove NER from the cognitive distance of national psyche and engage with the people at multiple levels. Ironically, sluggish and status quo mindset of political hierarchy in Delhi, within NER and bureaucracy has allowed the region to remain frozen in time and space. If the Government of India (GOI) continues to see NER through the prism of outdated and fixated mindset of the inflexible bureaucracy, India will find it more difficult to develop it as a springboard for Act East Policy of India.

One cannot ignore that Siliguri Corridor remains a fragile and vulnerable link with the NER. In fact, rail, road and fibre communication of India with NER passes through this narrow stretch of land that is barely 21 kilometres wide. China, Bangladesh and even Nepal look at Siliguri Corridor as a geographical frontier that is an impediment in their economic and strategic calculus. Siliguri Corridor separates Nepal from Bangladesh and China with Bangladesh through Nepal. Nepal requires access through Siliguri Corridor to export electricity to Bangladesh and similarly, Bangladesh needs access for trade and transit through Siliguri Corridor to Nepal. Bhutan too requires access to Bangladesh for two way trade and export of electricity that is needed by Bangladesh. Siliguri Corridor is emerging as a geographic pivot for even regional connectivity. On the other side, the radicals, insurgents and even the arms and drug traffickers see Siliguri Corridor as a bottleneck for their illegal activities. India should look at this narrow stretch with greater focus to prevent choking / blocking of this strategic link by Jihadis, and proxies, who could find support from China, Bangladesh and the Maoist from Nepal.

Insurgency and Secessionist Movements

One of the Naga tribal leaders told the author few years back, "The past does not make us privileged, the present does not inspire us and future doesn't give us hope".

According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, North-eastern states have seen an 85 per cent drop in violent activities in the last 17 years. However, this peace cannot be termed as enduring since Naga Peace Accord continues to remain inconclusive, Manipur is still restive, no talks with the Meitei insurgent groups and ULFA faction of Paresh Baruah continues to be active. The Naga National People's Group (NNPG) is keen to wind up the accord with or without National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) (IM), however, an accord without NSCN (IM) will be of little consequence, since they are the largest and strongest rebel group with influence in Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal and Assam.

The major worry for the security forces should be reorganisation and realigning of anti-talk groups of the Northeast. Insurgent groups such as Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), Coordination Committee (CorCom) of Manipur and conglomerate of many insurgent groups mainly United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFW) (consisting of Paresh Baruah faction of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), anti-talks faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland Sonajit group (NDFB), People's Democratic Council of Karbi-Longri (PDCK), People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur and Kamatapur Liberation Organisation, besides the NSCN-K) endeavour to reorganise and reignite insurgency movement in the NER with the proxy support of Chinese intelligence agencies and ISI of Pakistan. Another worry is likely intervention of ISI of Pakistan through Jihadists in the Northeast. ISI cannot create pro Pakistan sentiments in Bangladesh but has been working to create anti India sentiments and arranging a meeting place between Jamaat-e-Islami and Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). ISI of Pakistan is working overtime to establish its network across entire East India through Jammat, political parties and indigenous insurgent groups.

Strategy of Encirclement

China needs Access to the Indian Ocean. David Lampton, Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and Chairman of the Asia Foundation, argues that, "(Beijing) makes friends with every regime that has energy in the ground".⁵ China is in Myanmar for access to Bay of Bengal, oil and gas and lucrative markets of South East Asia and as a result, it wants to keep India engaged internally, so that it

can keep India out of Myanmar. Veteran journalist-writer Bertil Lintner said, "In the old colonial days, the great game east was between Russia, Afghanistan and the British colonialists in India. Post-Independence, the action has moved to China, Myanmar and India. China is still looking to increase its net of operations in the Indian Ocean".⁶ China is looking to exploit Myanmar's 3.2 billion barrels of oil and 18 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas reserves.⁷ China is also wanting to exploit Myanmar's hydro-electric power potential that is estimated to be 1,00,000 MW. Therefore, China would do everything possible to contain India along the Indo-Myanmar border so that it can prevent India from encroaching upon China's strategic, economic and political space in Myanmar.

China using Proxies in NER. Lintner further said that China's role in the North-eastern India is not to create instability but "to maintain instability"⁸ because it wants to keep India out of Myanmar. One cannot overrule the fact that China intends to intensify its proxy war against India in the Northeast through the separatist groups. Phungting Shimrang, the former chief and senior member of the NSCN-IM, has reportedly gone to Yunan province in China with two of his trusted comrades. There are reports that 100 to 150 cadres of NSCN (IM) have ex-filtrated and now reached China. Shimrang had said that even if a settlement was not reached that time, the movement would not wear out. "Even if only 30 to 100 people are left, we will start again".⁹ It is reported that United National Liberation Front of South West Asia (UNLFW), a united front of nine insurgent groups, is covertly operating under the guidance of Chinese intelligence agencies to fight against Government of India. The fact that Paresh Barua and Shimrang reported to be in Yunnan, will be leveraged by China to reignite instability even if the Naga peace accord materialises. The intent will be to keep the Northeast India in turmoil so that China can interfere with India's conventional military posture, should there be a military standoff between the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army. An Intelligence Bureau (IB) official says that Chinese activity has seen a two-fold increase in the past year. "Ever since India has decided to talk peace with various NE groups in a bid to bring them to the mainstream, the Chinese have been on overdrive mode to help insurgent groups in this part of the country," the officer notes.¹⁰ Chinese regime's 3Ws strategy of psychological, legal and media warfare¹¹ has exhibited a growing interest in waging an asymmetrical form of warfare in areas that are deemed to constitute its 'core interests'¹² and Northeast India is in close proximity to its core interest of strategic linkages with Myanmar, TAR and access to Indian Ocean through Bay of Bengal.

ISI still a Spoiler of Peace. Even today, Pakistan feels that this region should not be allowed to remain stable and that is the region ISI never left even after 1971 and continues to maintain its presence directly or through proxies. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, wrote in his book 'The Myth of Independence', "Our controversy with India is not on the problem of Kashmir only; there is the problem of Assam. In Assam, there are some Muslim majority districts which should have been given to Pakistan (at the time of the partition, these districts were wrongly included in India)".¹³ The proxy war by Pakistan against India was not only triggered in Jammu and Kashmir but also in the Northeast. Naga and Meitei insurgency received impetus from Pakistan since early 50s. Phizo escaped to East Pakistan in 1957 and sought Pakistan's recognition of Nagaland and help in raising the issue of its independence in the United Nations (UN). Phizo asked Pakistan to recognise Nagaland as separate country. Pakistan not only supported Naga rebels but also played major part in fuelling Mizo and Meitei insurgency. It was on the behest of ISI that Paresh Barua had allegedly got non Assamese Hindus massacred in Assam through Assam Tiger Force (ATF).¹⁴

Pakistan may have been evicted from the Northeast, but ISI never left Bangladesh. Repatriated Bengali officers from Pakistan Army still have old connection with Pakistan and second the linkages of Jammat funded by Saudi Arabia with their counter parts in Pakistan. ISI facilitated meeting point for Jammat and radical Islamists in Bangladesh to enhance the agenda of creation of space for Wahhabi intolerant Islam and use this influence to create anti India sentiments in Bangladesh. Focus of ISI and Jammat is that if they cannot create a favourable pro Pakistan perception among the people then, at least, they should prevent creation of pro India sentiments among the people. The result of this proxy support by Pakistan ISI is that it has firmly supported Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh. Idea of having space in Bangladesh is to fuel instability in the Northeast and West Bengal.

Bangladesh a Peril for Instability. Sheikh Muzib-ur-Rahman, former President of Bangladesh, had similar sentiments towards

Assam and he said, "The population of East Bengal (Bangladesh) is increasing at alarming speed. Their inhabitants face acute shortage of land. The Bengalis need land, which can be given by Assam. Assam abounds in good forests and beautiful scenes of nature. If some inhabitants of Bangladesh migrate to Assam and settle there permanently, they will be very happy. Actually Assam should have been included in East-Pakistan".¹⁵ The desire to colonise and occupy parts of Assam is still an agenda for radical Muslims in Bangladesh. However, they forget that even Hindu dominated parts of Sylhet were unfairly merged with East Pakistan. The Chittagong Hill Tracts had tribal population of approximately 98 per cent and was set to be merged with India. However, it came as a shock to the tribal people that Chittagong was not included in India. As a result, even after the proclamation of boundary, the Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Association (CHTPA) hoisted the Indian flag. The Pakistan Army crushed the protest. Majority of them continue to remain refugees even now in Mizoram. Another cause of worry is that Jammat has revived in Bangladesh and is fast spreading across the rural areas. This has given impetus to the rise of Jihadists, mainly Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT), Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen-Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT). These terror organisations have ideological linkages with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. In 2012, the HuT with the help of Major Zia-ul-Hug, a disgruntled Bangladesh Army officer, attempted a failed coup. Major Zia managed to escape and subsequently became the de-facto chief of the ABT. This new militant outfit has been recruiting young Bangladeshis for arms training and organising specific attacks on secular rationalists and liberal intellectuals.¹⁶ The ABT is emerging as a major threat because of its popularity among the youth and attraction towards Al Qaeda. The outfit is politically affiliated to the Islami Chhatra Shibir-the student wing of Bangladesh's largest Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami. Interestingly, the outfit prefers more educated and elite recruits.¹⁷ According to Dr Christine Fair, "In fact, as both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda in South Asia have locked their sights on South Asia, Bangladesh deserves special attention".¹⁸ The role of Director General Forces Intelligence (DGFI) at times give suspicion that their hands are not clean when it comes to dealing with the insurgents from the Northeast. In fact, DGFI has hobnobbed with ULFA and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) in the past. In spite of the support Bangladesh government of the day has extended to India to deal with the insurgency in Assam, the peril of corridor from Bangladesh continues to remain an issue for Indian security agencies.

Myanmar the Fragile Borderland. Bangladesh and Myanmar have emerged as major routes for arms trafficking into NER. The major channels in Myanmar are the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). These two ethnic insurgent groups have acted as the interlocking chain for the illegal weapons flow from Yunnan in China via Myanmar to Northeast India.¹⁹ Myanmar may not be actively supporting the insurgency in the Northeast but, due to lack of control over undeveloped border areas, is acting as safe havens for Indian Insurgent Groups. Some of these groups are supported by Chinese intelligence agencies through KIA and KNU. Another group that is actively supporting Indian insurgents with arms and training is the United Wa State Army (UWSA).

Narcotic Trade

India is becoming a destination of drugs and narcotics from the Golden Triangle. From high-grade heroin to low-grade brown sugar, synthetic party drugs like 'World is Yours' and 'Yaba', the source is the infamous Golden Triangle of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos, known locally as Sop Ruak²⁰, now find India a lucrative market. Similarly, there is also a reverse flow of opium and heroin from NER to Myanmar. A security official associated with counter-insurgency operations in NER said, "We have information that the village of Joupi (close to Myanmar) has turned into a poppy cultivation ground. Heroin from these farms is being smuggled into Myanmar".²¹ Narcotics, weapons and gold smuggling is assisted by Free Move Regime that exist between India and Myanmar, where people can travel up to 16 km without visa or passport and are even allowed to carry head loads for barter trade. India and Bangladesh are the destination of narcotics from Myanmar. There are two main routes, Champhai through Mizoram and Manipur which is contiguous to Sagaing Division of Myanmar. This assumes significance because narcotic is one of the main resource of terror / insurgent funding.

Drug trafficking from Nepal through Siliguri Corridor is emerging as a new challenge to the security forces. *Hashish* and marijuana/*ganja* are the two derivatives of cannabis that have been customarily smuggled from Nepal into India.²² Good network of roads as well as unchecked and badly protected borders have assisted large smuggling of drugs. The road and rail connection between Assam and Nepal via Siliguri in West Bengal has been used for migration and smuggling activities.²³

As long as drug and narcotic trade remains a source of funding, insurgency in the Northeast will continue to simmer due to nexus of drug cartels, rogue intelligence agencies and insurgents.

Weapons Trafficking

There are three agencies that are instrumental in weapon trafficking to the insurgents in the Northeast and Left Wing Extremists namely, NSCN (IM), Paresh Barua and Chinese Norinco Ordinance Company. Weapons are manufactured by Chinese company and transported up to Indian borders by Paresh Barua, either directly or with the help of KNU and KIA, and finally distributed by NSCN (IM) and even ULFA (I). Paresh Barua is more of a warlord now, a mastermind in the trafficking of weapons.²⁴ US senator Larry Pressler had told Indian media persons in Kolkata during a visit that China was the world's major source of small arms proliferation that were "fuelling conflicts from Morocco to Malaysia". National Investigation Agency (NIA) officials say that Shimray has confessed to an attempt to bring in 1,100 AK-series rifles, machine guns and rocket launchers valued at \$2 m in the first consignment - and more later, if the route was found to be safe.²⁵ Indian intelligence says that Shimray's attempt to use the Cox's Bazar route indicates that India's Northeastern rebels still have strong connections in Bangladesh, especially in the Chittagong-Cox's Bazar area.²⁶ Drugs and weapons cumulatively are the factors that give impetus to insurgency and as long as the insurgents continue to get the access to weapons, instability in NER will remain.

The Real Challenge

Act East Policy is not novel in its character. India was trying to connect with the East Asian neighbours for long. In fact, the first Prime Minister of India, Pandit Nehru, while addressing over 200 delegates from 30 Asian nations and a handful of observer countries reminded his audience that, "India is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia". He further said, "India was the meeting point of Western and Northern and Eastern and South-East Asia" and "streams of culture" flowed to India and from India to the rest of Asia, influencing "vast numbers of people".²⁷

Subsequently, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao unveiled 'Look East' Policy in early 1990s for greater engagement with ASEAN and South East Asian countries. The current government brought the focus back to deeper engagement with its regional neighbours in the East with a new initiative under 'Act East' Policy.

The cornerstone of success of Act East Policy rests on India's ability to stabilise North-east, establish land, sea and air connectivity with ASEAN nations and South East Asia. Stability in the Northeast cannot be brought unless the regional neighbours are also made stakeholders in peace dividends. India will have to also take stringent measures to deal with arms and drug traffickers who are backed by a few insurgent groups within the Northeast and in Myanmar. Though China would attempt to derail India's efforts to establish peace, however, what is important is to work with Bangladesh, Myanmar and even with Nepal. This would also involve balancing China in Myanmar and ASEAN, whereas China is already working to ensure that India is restricted and contained within its own frontier. China is using political, economic and its proxies as well to maintain instability in the Northeast.

India can only put into effect 'Act East Policy' if it is able to stabilise the NER, bring insurgents and anti-talk factions to the negotiation table and establish physical connectivity with Myanmar and further to ASEAN nations. The bottom-line is that India requires a multi-pronged approach to deal with China, its proxies, insurgents, drug and weapon trafficking cartels and rogue agencies operating from within neighbouring countries. One factor that remains constant is China that has linkages with insurgents, weapon traffickers and rogue agencies. Thus, China is emerging as a major disruptive force in implementation of India's Act East Policy. Non-state actors and China would be more than eager to create vulnerabilities along the Siliguri Corridor through Jihadists and even through politically disaffected sections of society. China may even use Maoists of Nepal since Siliguri Corridor also acts as an obstruction for direct access to Bangladesh.

Endnotes

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